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Abstract. In encryption, non-malleability is a highly desirable property: it ensures that adversaries
cannot manipulate the plaintext by acting on the ciphertext. In [5], Ambainis et al. gave a definition of
non-malleability for the encryption of quantum data. In this work, we show that this definition is too
weak, as it allows adversaries to “inject” plaintexts of their choice into the ciphertext. We give a new
definition of quantum non-malleability which resolves this problem. Our definition is expressed in terms
of entropic quantities, considers stronger adversaries, and does not assume secrecy. Rather, we prove
that quantum non-malleability implies secrecy ; this is in stark contrast to the classical setting, where
the two properties are completely independent. For unitary schemes, our notion of non-malleability is
equivalent to encryption with a two-design (and hence also to the definition of [5]).
Our techniques also yield new results regarding the closely-related task of quantum authentication.
We show that “total authentication” (a notion recently proposed by Garg et al. [21]) can be satisfied
with two-designs, a significant improvement over the eight-design construction of [21]. We also show
that, under a mild adaptation of the rejection procedure, both total authentication and our notion of
non-malleability yield quantum authentication as defined by Dupuis et al. [17].
1 Introduction
Background. In its most basic form, encryption ensures secrecy in the presence of eavesdroppers. Besides
secrecy, another desirable property is non-malleability, which guarantees that an active adversary cannot
modify the plaintext by manipulating the ciphertext. In the classical setting, secrecy and non-malleability
are independent: there are schemes which satisfy secrecy but are malleable, and schemes which are non-
malleable but transmit the plaintext in the clear. If both secrecy and non-malleability is desired, then
pairwise-independent permutations provide information-theoretically perfect (one-time) security [24]. In the
computational security setting, non-malleability can be achieved by MACs, and ensures chosen-ciphertext
security for authenticated encryption.
In the setting of quantum information, encryption is the task of transmitting quantum states over a com-
pletely insecure quantum channel. Information-theoretic secrecy for quantum encryption is well-understood.
Non-malleability, on the other hand, has only been studied in one previous work, by Ambainis, Bouda and
Winter [5]. Their definition (which we will call ABW-non-malleability, or ABW-NM) requires that the scheme
satisfies secrecy, and that the “effective channel” Dec ◦ Λ ◦ Enc of any adversary Λ amounts to either the
identity map or replacement by some fixed state. In the case of unitary schemes, ABW-NM is equivalent
to encrypting with a unitary two-design. Unitary two-designs are a natural quantum analogue of pairwise-
independent permutations, and can be efficiently constructed in a number of ways (see, e.g., [11, 15].)
While quantum non-malleability has only been considered by [5], the closely-related task of quantum
authentication (where decryption is allowed to reject) has received significant attention (see, e.g., [2, 7, 12,
17, 22, 31, 21].) The widely-adopted definition of Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail asks that the averaged effective
channel of any adversary is close to a map which does not touch the plaintext [17]; we refer to this notion as
DNS-authentication. Recent work by Garg, Yuen and Zhandry [21] established another notion of quantum
authentication, which they call “total authentication.” The notion of total authentication has two major
differences from previous definitions: (i.) it asks for success with high probability over the choice of keys,
rather than simply on average, and (ii.) it makes no demands whatsoever in the case that decryption rejects.
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We refer to this notion of quantum authentication as GYZ-authentication. In [21], it is shown that GYZ-
authentication can be satisfied with unitary eight-designs. In [22, 31], a different approach is taken. Here,
instead of using specialized security definitions, certain schemes are proven to provide an authenticated
channel in the universal composability [33, 8] and abstract cryptography [28] frameworks, respectively.
This work. In this work, we devise a new definition of non-malleability (denoted NM) for quantum en-
cryption, improving on ABW-NM in a number of ways. First, our definition is expressed in terms of entropic
quantities, which allows us to bring several quantum-information-theoretic techniques to bear (such as de-
coupling.) Second, we consider more powerful adversaries, which can possess side information about the
plaintext. Third, we remove the possibility of a “plaintext injection” attack, whereby an adversary against
an ABW-NM scheme can send a plaintext of their choice to the receiver. Finally, our definition does not
demand secrecy; instead, we show that quantum secrecy is a consequence of quantum non-malleability. This
is a significant departure from the classical case, and is analogous to the fact that quantum authentication
implies secrecy [7].
The primary consequence of our work is twofold: first, encryption with unitary two-designs satisfies all of
the above notions of quantum non-malleability; second, when equipped with blank “tag” qubits, the same
scheme also satisfies all of the above notions of quantum authentication. A more detailed summary of the
results is as follows. For schemes which have unitary encryption maps, we prove that NM is equivalent
to encryption with unitary two-designs, and hence also to ABW-NM. For non-unitary schemes, we prove
a characterization theorem for NM schemes that shows that NM implies ABW-NM, and provide a strong
separation example between NM and ABW-NM (the aforementioned plaintext injection attack). In the case
of GYZ authentication, we prove that two-designs (with tags) are sufficient, a significant improvement over
the state-of-the-art, which requires eight-designs [21]. Moreover, the simulation of adversaries in this proof is
efficient, in the sense of Broadbent and Wainewright [12]. Finally, we show that GYZauthentication implies
DNS-authentication, and that equipping an arbitrary NM scheme with tags yields DNS-authentication.
We remark that, after the initial version of our results was completed and submitted, an independent
work of C. Portmann on quantum authentication appeared [31]; it gives an alternative proof that GYZ-
authentication can be satisfied by the 2-design scheme.
1.1 Summary of contributions
A more technical summary of our contributions follows. We remark here that all of our results concern
information-theoretic security notions for symmetric-key encryption of quantum data.
Quantum non-malleability. Our first set of results is concerned with non-malleability. The results hold
in both the perfect setting (Section 3) and the approximate setting (Section 4).
1. New definition of non-malleability. We give a new definition of quantum non-malleability (NM), in
terms of the information gain of an adversary’s effective attack on the plaintext. The relevant quantum
registers are: plaintext A, ciphertext C, user’s reference R, and adversary’s side information B.
Definition 1.1 (NM, informal) A scheme is non-malleable (NM) if for any %ABR and any attack
ΛCB→CB˜, the effective attack Λ˜AB→AB˜ satisfies
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)).
The binary entropy term is necessary because adversaries can always simply record whether they dis-
turbed the ciphertext (see Definition 3.4).
2. Results on non-malleability. Our first result is that NM implies secrecy.
Theorem 1.2 (informal) For quantum encryption, non-malleability implies secrecy.
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We also show that NM implies ABW-NM, and give a separation scheme which is secure under ABW-
NM but insecure under NM. This scheme is in fact susceptible to a powerful attack, whereby a simple
adversary can replace the output of decryption with a plaintext of the adversary’s choice. On the other
hand, if we restrict our attention to schemes where the encryption maps are unitary, then we are able to
show the following.
Theorem 1.3 (informal) Let Π be a scheme such that encryption Ek is unitary for all keys k. Then
Π is NM if and only if {Ek}k is a two-design.
By the results of [5], we conclude that NM and ABW-NM are in fact equivalent for unitary schemes.
Finally, we can also characterize NM schemes in the general (i.e., not necessarily unitary) case, as follows.
Theorem 1.4 (informal) A scheme is NM if and only if, for any ΛCB→CB˜, there exist maps Λ
′
B→B˜,
Λ′′
B→B˜ such that the effective attack Λ˜AB→AB˜ has the form
Λ˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′ + 1|C|2 − 1 (|C| 〈DK(1C)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ
′′ .
3. Authentication from non-malleability. Our final result in the setting of non-malleability shows that,
by adding a “tag” space to the plaintext (as seen, e.g., in the Clifford scheme [2]), we can turn a non-
malleable scheme into an authentication scheme as defined in [17]. More precisely, given an encryption
scheme Π = {Ek}, we define Πtagt to be a new scheme whose encryption is % 7→ Ek
(
%A ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗tB
)
E†k,
and whose decryption rejects unless B measures to |0t〉.
Theorem 1.5 (informal) Let Π = {Ek} be an encryption scheme. If Π is NM, then Πtagt is 22−t-
DNS-authenticating.
Quantum authentication. Our results on quantum authentication are summarized as follows. We note
that, strictly speaking, our definitions of authentication deviate slightly from the original versions [17, 21],
in that decryption outputs a reject symbol in place of the plaintext (rather than setting an auxiliary bit to
“reject.”) This adaptation is convenient for reasons we will return to later.
1. GYZ implies DNS. First, we show that GYZ-authentication implies DNS-authentication. We remark
that this is not trivial: on one hand, GYZ strengthens DNS by requiring high probability of success (rather
than success on-average); on the other hand, in the reject case GYZ requires nothing while DNS makes
rather stringent demands. Nonetheless, we show the following.
Theorem 1.6 (informal) Let Π be an encryption scheme. If Π is ε-GYZ-authenticating, then it is also
O(
√
ε)-DNS-authenticating.
2. GYZ is achievable with 2-designs. Next, we show that GYZ-authentication can be satisfied by a
scheme which “tags” plaintexts as before, and encrypts with a unitary 2-design. This is a significant
improvement over the analysis of [21], which required eight-designs for the same construction.
Theorem 1.7 (informal) Let Π = {Ek}k be a 2−t-approximate 2-design scheme. Then Πtagt is 2−Ω(t)-
GYZ-authenticating.
3. GYZ authentication from non-malleability. Finally, we record a straightforward consequence of
Theorem 1.3 and Theorem 1.7: tagging a unitary non-malleable scheme results in a GYZ-authenticating
scheme.
Corollary 1.8 (informal) There exists a constant r > 0 such that the following holds. If Π is a
unitary Ω(2−rn)-NM scheme for n-qubit messages, and t = poly(n), then Πtagt is 2
−Ω(poly(n))-GYZ-
authenticating.
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We remark that a sufficiently strong NM scheme for the above can be constructed via the -approximate
version of Theorem 1.3 (see Theorem 4.5 and Remark 2.3 below.)
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review some basic facts regarding
quantum states, registers, and channels, and recall several useful facts about unitary designs. In Section 3,
we consider the exact setting, beginning with perfect secrecy and then continuing to perfect non-malleability
(NM) and the relevant new results; we also discuss the relationship to ABW-NM in detail. While the exact
setting is relatively simple and conceptually clean, it is not relevant in practical settings. We thus continue
in Section 4 by developing the approximate setting, again beginning with secrecy and then continuing to
approximate non-malleability. We end with the new results on quantum authentication, in Section 4.2.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum states, registers, and channels.
We assume basic familiarity with the formalism of quantum states, operators, and channels. We denote
quantum registers (i.e., systems and their subsystems) with capital Latin letters, e.g., A,B,C. The Hilbert
space corresponding to system A is denoted by HA. For a register A, we denote the dimension of HA by |A|.
We emphasize that, in this work, all Hilbert spaces will be finite-dimensional.
The space operators on HA is denoted B(HA). We say that a quantum state is classical if it is diagonal
in the standard (i.e., computational) basis. We denote the adjoint of an operator X ∈ B(H) by X† and its
transose with respect to the computational basis by XT . Where necessary, we will write a quantum state
% ∈ B(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC) as %ABC to emphasize that the state is a multipartite state over registers A, B,
and C. When such a state has already been defined, we will write reduced states by omitting the traced-out
registers, e.g., %A := TrBC [%ABC ]. We single out some special states which will appear frequently. Fix two
systems S, S′ with |S| = |S′|. We let
|φ+〉SS′ = |S|−1/2
∑
i
|ii〉SS′ and φ+SS′ = |φ+〉〈φ+|SS′
denote the maximally entangled state on the bipartite system SS′ (expressed as a pure state on the left, and
as a density operator on the right.) Furthermore, we let Π−SS′ = 1SS′ − φ+SS′ and τ−SS′ = Π−SS′/(|S|2 − 1).
We also set τS = 1S/|S| to be the maximally mixed state on S.
We denote the von Neumann entropy of a state %A by H(A)%, and the joint entropy of %AB by H(AB)%.
We recall that the quantum mutual information of %AB is defined by
I(A : B)% := H(A)% +H(B)% −H(AB)% .
The quantum conditional mutual information of %ABC is defined by
I(A : B|C)% := H(AC)% +H(BC)% −H(ABC)% −H(C)% .
These quantities are nonnegative [25] and satisfy a chain rule:
I(A : BC|D)% = I(A : B|D)% + I(A : C|BD)% .
We remark that the above also holds for trivial D. Together with the Stinespring dilation theorem [32],
nonnegativity [25] and the chain rule imply the data processing inequality
I(A : B˜|C)Λ(%) ≤ I(A : B|C)% ,
when Λ is a CPTP (completely-positive, trace-preserving) map from B(HB) to B(HB˜). An important special
case is where B = B1B2 and Λ = TrB2 discards the contents of B2.
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We will refer to valid transformations between quantum states as channels, or CPTP maps. We will some-
times also consider trace-non-increasing completely-positive (CP) maps. When necessary, we will emphasize
the input and output spaces of a map
Λ : B(HA ⊗HB)→ B(HC)
by writing ΛAB→C . We denote the identity channel on, e.g., register A by idA→A (or simply idA) and the
channel from register A to A′ with constant output σA′ by 〈σ〉A→A′ . When composing operators on many
registers, and if the context allows, we will elide tensor products with the identity operator. So, for example,
with Λ as above we may write τCD = Λ%ABD in place of τCD = (Λ⊗ idD)%ABD.
A standard tool for analyzing operators on matrix spaces is the Choi-Jamio lkowski (CJ) isomorphism
[13, 23]. Let ΞA→B : B(HA)→ B(HB) be a linear operator. Then its CJ matrix is defined as
(ηΞ)BA′ = ΛA→B(φ
+
AA′). (2.1)
The linear operator mapping Ξ to ηΞ is an isomorphism of vector spaces and ηΞ is positive semidefinite iff
Ξ is CP. Moreover ΞA→B is TP iff (ηΞ)A′ = τA. The inverse of the CJ isomorphism is given by the equation
ΞA→B(XA) = |A|TrA′
[
XTA′ (ηΞ)BA′
]
. (2.2)
An operator which will appear often is the swap: F : |i〉 ⊗ |j〉 7→ |j〉 ⊗ |i〉. We will frequently refer to the
following fact; a proof appears in [18].
Lemma 2.1 (Swap trick) For any matrices A,B we have Tr[AB] = Tr[FA⊗B].
We denote the trace norm by ‖ · ‖1, the infinity (or operator) norm by ‖ · ‖∞, and the diamond norm1
by ‖ · ‖. A basic inequality we will make use of is the Ho¨lder inequality for operators, which we take to be
Tr[XY ] ≤ ‖XY ‖1 ≤ ‖X‖1‖Y ‖∞ , (2.3)
for any two operators X and Y .
2.2 Unitary designs.
We now recall the definition of unitary t-design, and some relevant variants. We begin by considering three
different types of “twirls.”
1. For a finite subset D ⊂ U(H) of the unitary group on some finite dimensional Hilbert space H, let
T (t)D (X) =
1
|D|
∑
U∈D
U⊗tX
(
U†
)⊗t
(2.4)
be the associated t-twirling channel. If we take the entire unitary group (rather than just a finite subset),
then we get the Haar t-twirling channel
T (t)Haar(X) =
∫
U⊗tX
(
U†
)⊗t
dU. (2.5)
The case t = 2 is characterized in Lemma B.8 in Appendix B.
2. We define the U -U twirl with respect to finite D ⊂ U(H) by
T D(X) = 1|D|
∑
U∈D
(
U ⊗ U)X (U ⊗ U)† . (2.6)
The analogous U -U Haar twirling channel is denoted by T Haar.
1 This is the dual of the completely bounded norm: ‖ΛA→B‖ = max%AA′ ‖ΛA→B ⊗ idA′(%AA′)‖1, where the max is
taken over all pure quantum states %AA′ and HA ∼= HA′ .
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3. The third and final notion is called a channel twirl; this is defined in terms of U -U -twirling, as follows.
Given a channel Λ, let ηΛ be the CJ state of Λ. The channel twirl T chD (Λ) of Λ is defined to be the
channel whose CJ state is T D(ηΛ).
Next, we define three notions of designs, corresponding to the three types of twirl defined above.
Definition 2.2 Let D ⊂ U(H) be a finite set. We define the following.
– If
∥∥T (t)D − T (t)Haar∥∥ ≤ δ holds, then D is a δ-approximate t-design.
– If
∥∥T D − T Haar∥∥ ≤ δ holds, then D is a δ-approximate U -U -twirl design.
– If
∥∥T chD (Λ)− T chHaar(Λ)∥∥ ≤ δ holds for all CPTP maps Λ, then D is a δ-approximate channel-twirl design.
For all three of the above, the case δ = 0 is called an “exact design” (or simply “design”.) All three notions of
design are equivalent in the exact case. In the approximate case they are still connected, but there are some
nontrivial costs in the approximation quality (See [26], Lemma 2.2.14, and Lemma B.7 in Appendix B).
It is well-known that ε-approximate t-designs on n qubits can be generated by random quantum circuits
of size polynomial in n, t and log(1/ε) [11]. In particular, the size of these circuits is polynomial even for
exponentially-small choices of ε. We emphasize this observation as follows.
Remark 2.3 Fix a polynomial t in n. Then, for any ε > 0, a random n-qubit quantum circuit consisting
of poly(n, log(1/ε)) gates (from a universal set) satisfies every notion of -approximate t-design in Defini-
tion 2.2.
For exact designs, we point out two important constructions. First, the prototypical example of a unitary
one-design on n qubits is the n-qubit Pauli group. For exact unitary two-designs, the standard example
is the Clifford group, which is the normalizer of the n-qubit Pauli group. Alternatively, the Clifford group
is generated by circuits from the gate set {H,P,CNOT}. It is well-known that one can efficiently generate
exact unitary two-designs on n-qubits by building appropriate circuits from this gate set, using O(n2) random
bits [1, 15].
3 The zero-error setting
We begin with the zero-error. In the case of secrecy, zero-error means that schemes cannot leak any informa-
tion whatsoever. In the case of non-malleability, zero-error means that the adversary cannot increase their
correlations with the secret by even an infinitesimal amount (except by trivial means; see below.)
3.1 Perfect secrecy
We begin with a definition of symmetric-key quantum encryption. Our formulation treats rejection during
decryption in a slightly different manner from previous literature.
Definition 3.1 (Encryption scheme) A symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme (QES) is a triple
(τK , E,D) consisting of a classical state τK ∈ B(HK) and a pair of channels
E : B(HA ⊗HK) −→ B(HC ⊗HK)
D : B(HC ⊗HK) −→ B((HA ⊕ C|⊥〉)⊗HK)
satisfying [D ◦ E](· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) = (idA ⊕ 0⊥)⊗ |k〉〈k| for all k.
The Hilbert spaces HA, HC and HK are implicitly defined by the triple (τK , E,D). The state |⊥〉 is an error
flag that allows the decryption map to report an error. For notational convenience when dealing with these
schemes, we set
Ek = E(· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) EK = TrKE(· ⊗ τK)
Dk = D(· ⊗ |k〉〈k|) DK = TrKD(· ⊗ τK) .
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We will often slightly abuse notation by referring to decryption maps Dk as maps from C to A; in fact, the
output space of Dk is really the slightly larger space A¯ := A⊕ C|⊥〉.
It is natural to define secrecy in the quantum world in terms of quantum mutual information. However,
instead of asking for the ciphertext to be uncorrelated with the plaintext as in the classical case, we ask for
the ciphertext to be uncorrelated from any reference system.
Definition 3.2 (Perfect secrecy) A QES (τK , E,D) satisfies information - theoretic secrecy (ITS) if, for
any Hilbert space HB and any %AB ∈ B(HA ⊗HB), setting σCBK = E(%AB ⊗ τK) implies I(C : B)σ = 0.
We note that, for perfect ITS, adding side information is unnecessary: the definition already implies
that the ciphertext is in product with any other system. In particular, if the adversary has some auxiliary
system E in their possession, then I(B : CE)σ = I(B : E)σ. Several definitions of secrecy for symmetric-key
quantum encryption have appeared in the literature, but the above formulation appears to be new. It can
be shown that ITS is equivalent to perfect indistinguishability of ciphertexts (IND). The latter notion is a
special case of an early indistinguishability-based definition of Ambainis et al. [4].
In many situations it makes sense to restrict ourselves to QES that have identical plaintext and ciphertext
spaces; due to correctness, this is equivalent to unitarity.
Definition 3.3 (Unitary scheme) A QES (τK , E,D) is called unitary if the encryption and decryption
maps are controlled unitaries, i.e., if there exists V =
∑
k U
(k)
A ⊗ |k〉〈k|K such that E(X) = V XV †.
It is straightforward to prove that, for unitary schemes, ITS is equivalent to the statement that the encryption
maps {Ek} form a unitary 1-design. Note that unitarity of Ek and correctness imply unitarity of Dk.
3.2 A new notion of non-malleability
Definition. We consider a scenario involving a user Alice and an adversary Mallory. The scenario begins
with Mallory preparing a tripartite state %ABR over three registers: the plaintext A, the reference R, and the
side-information B. The registers A and R are given to Alice, while Mallory keeps B. Alice then encrypts A
into a ciphertext C and then transmits (or stores) it in the open. Mallory now applies an attack map
Λ : B(HC ⊗HB)→ B(HC ⊗HB˜) .
Mallory keeps the (transformed) side-information B˜ and returns C to Alice. Finally, Alice decrypts C back
to A, and the scenario ends. We are now interested in measuring the extent to which Mallory was able to
Fig. 1. The quantum non-malleability scenario.
increase her correlations with Alice’s systems A and R. This can be understood by analyzing the mutual
information I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) where Λ˜AB→AB˜ is the effective channel corresponding to Mallory’s attack:
Λ˜ = TrK(D ◦ Λ ◦ E)((·)⊗ τK) . (3.1)
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We point out one way in which Mallory can always increase these correlations, regardless of the structure
of the encryption scheme. First, she flips a coin b, and records the outcome in B. If b = 1, she replaces the
contents of C with some fixed state σC , and otherwise she leaves C untouched. One then sees that Mallory’s
correlations have increased by h(p=(Λ, %)), where h denotes binary entropy and p= is a defined as follows.
p=(Λ, %) = Tr
[
(φ+CC′ ⊗ 1B˜)Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ %B)
]
. (3.2)
This quantity is the inner product between the identity map and the map Λ(( · )⊗ %B), expressed in terms
of CJ states. Intuitively, it measures the probability with which Mallory chooses to apply the identity map;
taking the binary entropy then gives us the information gain resulting from recording this choice.
We are now ready to define information-theoretic quantum non-malleability. Stated informally, a scheme
is non-malleable if Mallory can only implement the attacks described above.
Definition 3.4 (Non-malleability) A QES (τK , E,D) is non-malleable (NM) if for any state %ABR and
any CPTP map ΛCB→CB˜, we have
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)). (3.3)
One might justifiably wonder if the term h(p=(Λ, %)) is too generous to the adversary. However, as
we showed above, every scheme is vulnerable to an attack which gains this amount of information. This
term also appears (somewhat disguised) in the classical setting. In fact, if a classical encryption scheme
satisfies Definition 3.4 against classical adversaries, then it also satisfies classical information-theoretic non-
malleability as defined in [24]. Finally, as we will show in later sections, Definition 3.4 implies ABW-NM
(see Definition 3.8), and schemes satisfying Definition 3.4 are sufficient for building quantum authentication
under the strongest known definitions.
Non-malleability implies secrecy. In the classical case, non-malleability is independent from secrecy: the
one-time pad is secret but malleable, and non-malleability is unaffected by appending the plaintext to each
ciphertext. In the quantum case, on the other hand, we can show that NM implies secrecy. This is analogous
to the fact that “quantum authentication implies encryption” [7]. The intuition is straightforward: (i.) one
can only make use of one copy of the plaintext due to no-cloning, and (ii.) if the adversary can distinguish
between two computational-basis states (e.g., |0〉 and |1〉) then they can also apply an undetectable Fourier-
basis operation (e.g., mapping |+〉 to |−〉). The technical statement and proof follows.
Proposition 3.5 Let (τK , E,D) be an NM QES. Then (τK , E,D) is ITS.
Proof. Let B, %AB , and σCBK = E(%AB⊗τK) be as in the definition of ITS (Definition 3.2). We first rename
B to R. We then consider the non-malleability property in the following special-case scenario. The initial
side-information register is empty, the final side-information register B˜ satisfies HB˜ ∼= HC , and the adversary
map ΛC→CB˜ is defined as follows. Note that the “ciphertext-extraction” map ΘC→CB˜ = idC→B˜(·)⊗ τC has
CJ state ηΘ
CC′B˜
= φ+
C′B˜
⊗ τC . We choose Λ so that its CJ state satisfies
ηΛ
CC′B˜ =
d2
d2 − 1Π
−
CC′ η
Θ
CC′B˜ Π
−
CC′ . (3.4)
Applying the above projection to the CJ state of Θ ensures that Λ will have p=(Λ) = 0 (note: p=(Θ) > 0.)
Direct calculation of the C ′B˜ marginal of the CJ state of Λ yields
ηΛ
C′B˜ =
d2 − 2
d2 − 1φ
+
C′B˜
+
1
d2 − 1τC′ ⊗ τB˜ . (3.5)
This implies that the output σARB˜ = Λ˜A→AB˜(%AB) of the effective channel Λ˜ will satisfy
σB˜R =
d2 − 2
d2 − 1γB˜R +
1
d2 − 1τB˜ ⊗ %R, (3.6)
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where γCR = (EK)A→C(%AR) and we used the fact that HB˜ ∼= HC . By non-malleability, we have
I(B˜ : R)σ + I(B˜ : A|R)σ = I(B˜ : AR)σ = 0. (3.7)
In particular, I(B˜ : R)σ = 0 and thus σB˜R = σB˜ ⊗ %R. It follows by Equation (3.6) that
γB˜R =
d2 − 1
d2 − 2
(
σB˜ −
1
d2 − 1τB˜
)
⊗ %R, (3.8)
i.e., γB˜R is a product state. This is precisely the definition of information-theoretic secrecy. uunionsq
Characterization of non-malleable schemes. Next, we provide a characterization of non-malleable
schemes. First, we show that unitary schemes are equivalent to encryption with a unitary 2-design.
Theorem 3.6 A unitary QES (τK , E,D) is NM if and only if {Ek}k∈K is a unitary 2-design.
This fact is particularly intuitive when the 2-design is the Clifford group, a well-known exact 2-design. In
that case, a Pauli operator acting on only one ciphertext qubit will be “propagated” (by the encryption
circuit) to a completely random Pauli on all plaintext qubits. The plaintext is then maximally mixed, and
the adversary gains no information. The Clifford group thus yields a perfectly non-malleable (and perfectly
secret) encryption scheme using O(n2) bits of key [1].
It will be convenient to prove Theorem 3.6 as a consequence of our general characterization theorem,
which is as follows.
Theorem 3.7 Let (τ, E,D) be a QES. Then (τ, E,D) is NM if and only if, for any attack ΛCB→CB˜, the
effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜ has the form
Λ˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ (3.9)
where Λ′ = TrCC′ [φ+CC′Λ(φ
+
CC′ ⊗ (·))] and Λ′′ = TrCC′ [Π−CC′Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))].
We remark that the forward direction holds even if (τ, E,D) only fulfills the NM condition (Equation
(3.3)) against adversaries with empty side-information B. The proof of Theorem 3.7 (with this strengthening)
is sketched below. The full proof is somewhat technical and can be found in Appendix C. More precisely, we
prove the stronger Theorem C.3, which implies the above by setting ε = 0.
Proof sketch. The first implication, i.e. NM implies Equation (3.9), is best proven in the Choi-Jamoi lkowski
picture. Here, any QES defines a map
ECC′→AA′ = 1|K|
∑
k
Dk ⊗ ETk , (3.10)
where the transpose ETk is the map whose Kraus operators are the transposes of the Kraus operators of Ek
(in the standard basis). Our goal is to prove that this map essentially acts like the UU¯ -twirl. We decompose
the space H⊗2C as
H⊗2C = C|φ+〉 ⊕ suppΠ− (3.11)
which induces a decomposition of
B(H⊗2C ) = C|φ+〉〈φ+| ⊕
{∣∣φ+〉〈v| ∣∣∣ 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0}
⊕
{
|v〉〈φ+∣∣ ∣∣∣ 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0}⊕ {X ∈ B∣∣∣〈φ+|X = X|φ+〉 = 0} . (3.12)
On the first and last direct summands, the correct behavior of E is easy to show: the first one corresponds to
the identity, and the last one to the non-identity channels Λ with p=(Λ) = 0. For the remaining two spaces,
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we employ Lemma B.9 which shows that the encryption map of any valid encryption scheme has the form
of appending an ancillary mixed state and then applying an isometry. Evaluating E(|φ+〉〈v|) for 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0
reduces to evaluating the adjoint of the average encryption map, E†K , on traceless matrices. It is, however,
easy to verify that
TrAECC′→AA′(σC ⊗ (·)C′) = (ETK)C′→A′
for any σC . This can be used to prove EK = 〈τC〉 by observing that 〈φ+|CC′σC ⊗ %C′ |φ+〉CC′ = Tr(σC%C),
so for rank-deficient % we can calculate ECC′→AA′(σC ⊗ (·)C′) using what we have already proven.
The other direction is proven by a simple application of Lemma B.4. uunionsq
The fact that NM is equivalent to 2-designs (for unitary schemes) is a straightforward consequence of the
above.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.6) First, assume (τK , E,D) is a unitary NM QES with Ek = Uk(·)U†k . Then it has
|C| = |A|, and DK(τC) = τA, so the conclusion of Theorem 3.7 in this case (i.e., Equation (3.9)) is exactly
the condition for {Uk} to be an exact channel twirl design and therefore an exact 2-design. If (τK , E,D),
on the other hand, is a unitary QES and {Uk} is a 2-design, then Equation (3.9) holds and the scheme is
therefore NM according to Theorem 3.7.
Relationship to ABW non-malleability. Ambainis, Bouda and Winter give a different definition of
non-malleability, expressed in terms of the effective maps that an adversary can apply to the plaintext by
acting on the ciphertext produced from encrypting with a random key [5]. According to their definition, a
scheme is non-malleable if the adversary can only apply maps from a very restricted class when averaging
over the key, and without giving side information to the active adversary. Let us recall their definition here.
First, given a QES (τK , E,D), we define the set S := {DK(σC) |σC ∈ B(HC)} consisting of all valid
average decryptions. We then define the class CSA of all “replacement channels”. This is the set of CPTP
maps belonging to the space
spanR{idA, (X 7→ Tr(X)σA) : σA ∈ S} . (3.13)
We then make the following definition, which first appeared in [5].
Definition 3.8 (ABW non-malleability) A QES (τK , E,D) is ABW-non-malleable (ABW-NM) if it is
ITS, and for all channels ΛC→C , we have
TrK [DCK→AK ◦ ΛC→C ◦ EAK→CK( · ⊗ τK)] ∈ CSA. (3.14)
As indicated in [5], an approximate version of Equation (3.14) is obtained by considering the diamond-
norm distance between the effective channel and the set CSA; this implies the possibility of an auxiliary
reference system, which is denoted R in NM. We emphasize that this reference system is not under the
control of the adversary. In particular, ABW-NM does not allow for adversaries which maintain and actively
use side information about the plaintext system.
Another notable distinction is that [5] includes a secrecy assumption in the definition of an encryption
scheme; under this assumption, it is shown that a unitary QES is ABW-NM if and only if the encryption
unitaries form a 2-design. By our Theorem 3.6, we see that NM and ABW-NM are equivalent in the case of
unitary schemes. So, in that case, ABW-NM actually ensures a much stronger security notion than originally
considered by the authors of [5].
In the general case, NM is strictly stronger than ABW-NM. First, by comparing the conditions of Defini-
tion 3.8 to Equation (3.9), we immediately get the following corollary of Theorem 3.7.
Corollary 3.9 If a QES satisfies NM, then it also satisfies ABW-NM.
Second, we give a separation example which shows that ABW-NM is highly insecure; in fact, it allows the
adversary to “inject” a plaintext of their choice into the ciphertext. This is insecure even under the classical
definition of information-theoretic non-malleability of [24]. We now describe the scheme and this attack.
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Example 3.10 Suppose (τK , E,D) is a QES that is both NM and ABW-NM. Define a modified scheme
(τK , E
′, D′), with enlarged ciphertext space HC′ = HC⊕HAˆ (where HAˆ ∼= HA) and encryption and decryption
defined by
E′(X) = E(X)C ⊕ 0Aˆ
D′(X) = DCK→AK(ΠCXΠC) + idAˆK→AK(ΠAˆXΠAˆ) .
Then (τK , E
′, D′) is ABW-NM but not NM.
While encryption ignores HAˆ, decryption measures if we are in C or Aˆ and then decrypts (in the first case)
or just outputs the contents (in the second case.) This is a dramatic violation of NM: set HB˜ ∼= HA, trivial
B and R, and
ΛC′→C′B˜(X) = Tr(X)0C ⊕ |φ+〉〈φ+|AˆB˜ ; (3.15)
it follows that, for all %,
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) = 2 log |A|  h(|C ′|−2) = h(p=(Λ, %)) . (3.16)
Now let us show that (τ, E′, D′) is still ABW-NM. Let ΛC′→C′ be an attack, i.e., an arbitrary CPTP map.
Then the effective plaintext map is
Λ˜A→A = D ◦ ΛCC→C ◦ E + ΛAˆC→A ◦ E, (3.17)
where ΛC(XC) = ΠCΛ(XC ⊕ 0Aˆ)ΠC and ΛAˆ(XC) = idAˆ→A(ΠAˆΛ(XC ⊕ 0Aˆ)ΠAˆ). Since (τ, E,D) is ITS
(Theorem 3.5), there exists a fixed state %0C such that EK(%A) = %
0
C for all %A. Since (τ, E,D) is ABW-NM,
we also know that
TrK ◦D ◦ ΛCC→C ◦ E = Λ˜1 ∈ CSA ,
with S = {DK(σC) |σC ∈ B(HC)}. We therefore get
Λ˜A→A = Λ˜1 + 〈ΛAˆ(%0C)〉 ∈ CS
′
A , (3.18)
with S′ = {D′K(σC′) |σC′ ∈ B(HC′)}. This is true because S′ contains all constant maps, as D′K(0C ⊕%Aˆ) =
%A.
4 The approximate setting
We now consider the case of approximate non-malleability. Approximate schemes are relevant for several
reasons. First, an approximate scheme with negligible error can be more efficient than an exact one: the
most efficient construction of an exact 2-design requires a quantum circuit of O(n log n log log n) gates [14],
where approximate 2-designs can be achieved with linear-length circuits [15]. Second, in practice, absolutely
perfect implementation of all quantum gates is too much to expect—even with error-correction. Third, when
passing to authentication one must allow for errors, as it is always possible for the adversary to escape
detection (with low probability) by guessing the secret key.
For all these reasons, it is important to understand what happens when the perfect secrecy and perfect
non-malleability requirements are slightly relaxed. In this section, we show that our definitions and results
are stable under such relaxations, and prove several additional results for quantum authentication. We begin
with the approximate-case analogue of perfect secrecy.
Definition 4.1 (Approximate secrecy) Fix ε > 0. A QES (τK , E,D) is ε-approximately secret (-ITS)
if, for any HB and any %AB, setting σCBK = E(%AB ⊗ τK) implies I(C : B)σ ≤ ε.
Analogously to the exact case, unitary schemes satisfying approximate secrecy are equivalent to approx-
imate one-designs (see Appendix A.1).
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4.1 Approximate non-malleability
Definition. We now define a natural approximate-case analogue of NM, i.e., Definition 3.4. Let us briefly
recall the context. The malleability scenario is described by systems A, C, B and R (respectively, plaintext,
ciphertext, side-information, and reference), an initial tripartite state %ABR, and an attack channel ΛCB→CB˜ .
Given this data, we have the effective channel Λ˜AB→AB˜ defined in Equation (3.1) and the “unavoidable
attack” probability p=(Λ, %) defined in Equation (3.2). The new definition now simply relaxes the requirement
on the increase of the adversary’s mutual information.
Definition 4.2 (Approximate non-malleability) A QES (τK , E,D) is ε-non-malleable (ε-NM) if for
any state %ABR and any CPTP map ΛCB→CB˜, we have
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)) + ε. (4.1)
We record the approximate version of Proposition 3.5, i.e., non-malleability implies secrecy. The proof is
a straightforward adaptation of the exact case.
Proposition 4.3 Let (τK , E,D) be an ε-NM QES. Then (τK , E,D) is 2ε-ITS.
Non-malleability with approximate designs. Continuing as before, we now generalize the characteri-
zation theorems of non-malleability (Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.6) to the approximate case.
Theorem 4.4 Let (τ, E,D) be a QES with ciphertext dimension |C| = 2m and r > 0 a sufficiently large
constant. Then the following holds:
1. If (τ, E,D) is 2−rm-NM, then for any attack ΛCB→CB˜, the effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜ is 2
−Ω(m)-close (in
diamond norm) to
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ ,
with Λ′, Λ′′ as in Theorem 3.7.
2. Suppose that log |R| = O(2m), where R is the reference register in Definition 4.2. Then there exists a
constant r, such that if every attack ΛCB→CB˜ results in an effective map that is 2
−rm-close to Λ˜exact,
then the scheme is 2−Ω(m)-NM.
This theorem is proven with explicit constants in Appendix C as Theorem C.3. The condition on R required
for the second implication is necessary, as the relevant mutual information can at worst grow proportional
to the logarithm of the dimension according to the Alicki-Fannes inequality (Lemma B.5). This is not a
very strong requirement, as it should be relatively easy for the honest parties to put a bound on their total
memory.
Next, we record the corollary which states that, for unitary schemes, approximate non-malleability is
equivalent to encryption with an approximate 2-design. The proof proceeds as in the exact case, now starting
from Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.5 Let Π = (τK , E,D) be a unitary QES for n-qubit messages and f : N → N a function that
grows at most exponential. Then there exists a constant r > 0 such that
1. If {Ek} is a Ω(2−rn)-approximate 2-design and log |R| ≤ f(n), then Π is 2−Ω(n)-NM.
2. If Π is Ω(2−rn)-NM, then {Ek}k∈K is a 2−Ω(n)-approximate 2-design.
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Relationship to approximate ABW. Recall that, in Section 3.2, we discussed the relationship between
our notion of exact non-malleability and that of Ambainis et al. [5] (i.e., ABW-NM.) As we now briefly
outline, our conclusions carry over to the approximate case without any significant changes.
As described in Equation (3”) of [5], one first relaxes the notion of ABW-NM appropriately by requiring
that the containment (3.14) in Definition 3.8 holds up to ε error in the diamond-norm distance. In the unitary
case, both definitions are equivalent to approximate 2-designs (by the results of [5], and our Theorem 4.5).
In the case of general schemes, the plaintext injection attack described in Example 3.10 again shows that
approximate ABW-NM is insufficient, and that approximate NM is strictly stronger.
4.2 Authentication
We now consider the well-studied task of information-theoretic quantum authentication, and explain its
connections to non-malleability.
Definitions. Our definitions of authentication will be faithful to the original versions in [17, 21], with
one slight modification. When decryption rejects, our encryption schemes (Definition 3.1) output ⊥ in the
plaintext space, rather than setting an auxiliary qubit to a “reject” state. These definitions are equivalent
in the sense that one can always set an extra qubit to “reject” conditioned on the plaintext being ⊥ (or
vice-versa). Nonetheless, as we will see below, this mild change has some interesting consequences.
We begin with the definition of Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail [17], which demands that the effective average
channel of the attacker ignores the plaintext.
Definition 4.6 (DNS Authentication [17]) A QES (τK , E,D) is called ε-DNS-authenticating if, for any
CPTP-map ΛCB→CB′ , there exists CP-maps ΛaccB→B˜ and Λ
rej
B→B˜ such that Λ
acc +Λrej is 2 TP, and for all %AB
we have ∥∥TrKD(Λ(E(%AB ⊗ τK)))− (Λacc(%AB) + |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ Λrej(%B))∥∥1 ≤ ε . (4.2)
An alternative definition was recently given by Garg, Yuen and Zhandry [21]. It asks that, conditioned
on acceptance, with high probability the effective channel is close to a channel which ignores the plaintext.
Definition 4.7 (GYZ Authentication [21]) A QES (τK , E,D) is called ε-GYZ-authenticating if, for
any CPTP-map ΛCB→CB′ , there exists a CP-map ΛaccB→B˜ such that for all %AB∥∥ΠaccD(Λ(E(%AB ⊗ τK)))Πacc − Λacc(%AB)⊗ τK∥∥1 ≤ ε . (4.3)
Here Πacc is the acceptance projector, i.e. projection onto HA in HA ⊕ C|⊥〉.
A peculiar aspect of the original definition in [21] is that it does not specify the outcome in case of rejection,
and is thus stated in terms of trace non-increasing maps. Of course, all realistic quantum maps must be CPTP;
this means that the designer of the encryption scheme must still declare what to do with the contents of the
plaintext register after decryption. Our notion of decryption makes one such choice (i.e., output ⊥) which
seems natural.
GYZ authentication implies DNS authentication. A priori, the relationship between Definition 2.2
in [17] and Definition 8 in [21] is not completely clear. On one hand, the latter is stronger in the sense that
it requires success with high probability (rather than simply on average.) On the other hand, the former
makes the additional demand that the ciphertext is untouched even if we reject. As we will now show, with
our slight modification, we can prove that GYZ-authentication implies DNS-authentication.
2 Note that there is a typographic error in [17] and [12] at this point of the definition. In those papers, the two
effective maps are asked to sum to the identity, which is impossible for many obvious choices of Λ.
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Theorem 4.8 Let (τ, E,D) be ε-totally authenticating for sufficiently small ε. Then it is O(
√
ε)-DNS au-
thenticating.
Proof. Let ΛCB→CB˜ be a CPTP map and ε ≤ 62−2. By Definition 4.7 there exists a CP map Λ′B→B˜ such
that for all states %AB ,
‖ΠaD(Λ(E(%AB ⊗ τK)))Πa − Λ′(%AB ⊗ τK)))‖1 ≤ ε . (4.4)
Assume for simplicity that D = M⊥◦D, where M⊥ measures the rejection symbol versus the rest. (otherwise
we can define a new decryption map that way.) Define the CP maps
Λ
(1)
AB→B˜ = TrAΠaΛ˜(·)
Λ
(2)
AB→B˜ = 〈⊥|AΛ˜(·)|⊥〉A
Λ′′
B→B˜ = TrCΛ(EK(τA)⊗ (·)).
By Theorem 15 in [21] we have
|EK(%ABR)− EK(τA)⊗ %BR‖1 ≤ 14
√
ε, (4.5)
which implies that
‖TrA ⊗ Λ′′ − TrC ◦ Λ ◦ EK‖ ≤ εˆ := 14
√
ε. (4.6)
Note that
TrC ◦Λ◦EK = TrCK ◦Λ◦E((·)⊗ τK)
= TrAK ◦D◦Λ◦E((·)⊗ τK) = TrA◦Λ˜. (4.7)
On the other hand, we also have that, by Equation (4.4),∥∥TrA ◦ Λ˜− TrA ⊗ Λ′ − Λ(2)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥TrA (ΠaΛ˜(·))− Λ′∥∥ ≤ ε (4.8)
Combining Equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8), we get∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)∥∥ ≤ ε+ εˆ. (4.9)
Now observe that
[TrA ⊗ (Λ′ − Λ′′)B→B˜ ] ◦ΞA→A = TrA ⊗ (Λ′ − Λ′′)B→B˜ (4.10)
For all CPTP maps ΞA→A. We define Λ′′′B→B˜ = Λ
(2)(τA ⊗ (·)) and calculate∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ≤ ∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)∥∥
+
∥∥TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ,
by the triangle inequality for the diamond norm. Continuing with the calculation,∥∥Λ(2) − TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥ ≤ ε+ εˆ+ ∥∥TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− TrA ⊗ Λ′′′∥∥
= ε+ εˆ+
∥∥TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− Λ(2) ◦ 〈τA〉A→A∥∥
= ε+ εˆ+
∥∥[TrA ⊗ (Λ′′ − Λ′)− Λ(2)] ◦ 〈τA〉A→A∥∥
≤ 2(ε+ εˆ) = 28√ε+ 2ε. (4.11)
The first inequality above is Equation (4.9). The first equality is just a rewriting of the definition of Λ′′′, and
the second equality is Equation (4.10). Finally, the last inequality is due to Equation (4.9) and the fact that
the diamond norm is submultiplicative.
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We have almost proven security according to Definition 4.6, as we have shown Λ˜ to be close in diamond
norm to idA ⊗ Λ′ +
〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λ′′′. However, Λ′ + Λ′′′ is only approximately TP; more precisely, we have
that for all %ABR,
|Tr(Λ′ + Λ′′′)(%ABR)− 1| = |Tr(Λ′ + Λ′′′ − Λ)(%ABR)|
≤ |Tr(Λ′ − Λ(1))(%ABR)|+ |Tr(Λ′′′ − Λ(2))(%ABR)|
≤ 28√ε+ 3ε. (4.12)
We therefore have to modify Λ′ + Λ′′ so that it becomes TP, while keeping the structure required for DNS
authentication. Let MB = (Λ
′ + Λ′′′)†(1B˜), and λmin and λmax its minimal and maximal eigenvalue. Then
Equation (4.12) is equivalent to λmin ≥ 1 − η and Λmax ≤ 1 + η, where we have set η := 28
√
ε + 3ε. Now
define the corresponding CP-map, i.e., M(X) = M−1/2XM−1/2. Note that M is invertible for η < 1 which
follows from ε ≤ 62−2. We bound
‖M− id‖ = sup
%BE
∥∥M−1/2B %BEM−1/2B − %BE∥∥1
≤ sup
%BE
{∥∥M−1/2B %BE(M−1/2B − 1B)∥∥1 + ∥∥(M−1/2B − 1B)%AB∥∥1}
≤ (∥∥M−1/2∥∥∞ + 1)∥∥M−1/2 − 1∥∥∞
= (1 + λ
−1/2
min ) max(1− λ−1/2max , λ−1/2min − 1)
≤ (1 + (1− η)−1/2) max[1− (1 + η)−1/2, (1− η)−1/2 − 1]
= (1 + (1− η)−1/2)((1− η)−1/2 − 1) = η
1− η ≤ 2η (4.13)
The first inequality is the triangle inequality of the trace norm. The second inequality follows by three
applications of Ho¨lder’s inequality with p = 1 and q = ∞. The last inequality follows from the assumption
ε ≤ 62−2. The second to last equality holds because √1 + x ≤ 1+ x2 and (1+x/2)−1 ≥ 1−x/2 for x ∈ [−1, 1]
imply
(1− η)−1/2 − 1 ≥(1− η/2)−1 − 1 ≥ η/2 (4.14)
and
1− (1 + η)−1/2 ≤1− (1 + η/2)−1 ≤ η/2. (4.15)
Altogether we have∥∥(idA ⊗ Λ′ + 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉⊗ Λ′′′) ◦M− Λ˜∥∥
≤ ∥∥(idA ⊗ Λ′ + 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉⊗ Λ′′′ − Λ˜) ◦M∥∥ + ∥∥Λ˜ ◦ (M− id)∥∥
≤ ∥∥idA ⊗ Λ′ + 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉⊗ Λ′′′ − Λ˜∥∥‖M‖ + ∥∥M− id∥∥
=
(∥∥idA ⊗ Λ′ −ΠaΛ˜Πa∥∥ + ∥∥〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉⊗ Λ′′′ − |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ Λ(2)∥∥)‖M−1‖∞
+ ‖M− id‖
≤ 2(ε+ 28√ε+ 2ε) + 2η = 4η (4.16)
The first and second inequality are the triangle inequality and the submultiplicativity of the diamond norm.
The third inequality is due to Equations (4.4), (4.11) and (4.13), as well as ε ≤ 62−2. For the first equality,
note that it is easy to check that ‖M‖ = ‖M−1/2‖2∞ = λ−1min.
uunionsq
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Achieving GYZ authentication with two-designs. In [21], the authors provide a scheme for their
notion of authentication based on unitary eight-designs. We now show that, in fact, an approximate 2-design
suffices. This is interesting, as it implies that the well-known Clifford scheme (see e.g [16, 12]) satisfies the
strong security of Definition 4.7. All of the previous results on authentication which use the Clifford scheme
thus automatically carry over to this stronger setting. We remark that our proof is inspired by the reasoning
based on Schur’s lemma used in results on decoupling [9, 18, 27, 10].
Theorem 4.9 Let D = {Uk}k be a δ-approximate unitary 2-design on HC . Let HC = HA ⊗HT and define
Ek(XA) = Uk (XA ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ) (Uk)†
Dk(YC) = 〈0|T (Uk)† Y Uk|0〉T + Tr((1T − |0〉〈0|T ) (Uk)† Y Uk)|⊥〉〈⊥| .
Then the QES (τK , E,D) is 4(1/|T |+ 3δ)1/3-GYZ-authenticating.
Remark 4.10 The following proof uses the same simulator as the proof for the 8-design scheme in [21],
called ”oblivious adversary” there. The construction exhibited there is efficient given that the real adversary
is efficient.
Proof. To improve readability, we will occasionally switch between adding subscripts to operators (indicating
which spaces they act on) and omitting these subscripts.
We begin by remarking that it is sufficient to prove the GYZ condition (specifically, Equation 4.3) for pure
input states and isometric adversary channels. Indeed, for a general state %AB and a general map ΛCB→CB˜ ,
we may let %ABR and VCB→CB˜E be the purification and Stinespring dilation, respectively. We then simply
observe that the trace distance decreases under partial trace (see e.g. [29]).
Let %AB be a pure input state and
ΛCB→CB˜(XCB) = VCB→CB˜XCBV
†
CB→CB˜
an isometry. We define the corresponding “ideal” channel ΓV , and the corresponding “real, accept” channel
Φk, as follows:
(ΓV )B→B˜ =
1
|C|TrCV and
(Φk)AB→AB˜ = 〈0|T (Uk)†CVCB→CB˜Uk|0〉T . (4.17)
Note that for any matrix M with ‖M‖∞ ≤ 1, the map ΛM (X) = M†XM is completely positive and trace
non-increasing. We have
‖ΓV ‖∞ ≤
1
|C|
∑
i
‖〈i|V |i〉‖∞ ≤ 1. (4.18)
We begin by bounding the expectation of ‖((ΓV )B→B˜ − (Φk)AB→AB˜)|%〉AB‖22, as follows. To simplify
notation, we set σABT := |%〉〈%|AB ⊗ |0〉〈0|T to be the tagged state corresponding to plaintext (and side
information) %AB .
1
|K|
∑
k
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖22 =
1
|K|
∑
k
〈%|(ΓV − Φk)†(ΓV − Φk)|%〉
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †Uk|0〉〈0|(Uk)†V Uk
]
− 2 1|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †UkΓV
]
+ 〈%| (ΓV )† ΓV |%〉 . (4.19)
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First we bound the second term, using the fact that ΓV only acts on B.
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†V †UkΓV
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
UkσABT (Uk)
†V †ΓV
]
=
∫
Tr
[(
UσABTU
† +∆
)
V †ΓV
] ≥ ∫ Tr [UσABTU†V †ΓV ]− δ
=
∫
Tr
[
σABTU
†V †UΓV
]− δ = 〈%| (ΓV )† ΓV |%〉 − δ . (4.20)
In the above, the operator ∆ is the “error” operator in the δ-approximate 2-design. The second equality
above follows from ‖∆‖1 ≤ δ and the fact that a 2-design is also a 1-design; the inequality follows by
Ho¨lder’s inequality, and the last step follows from Schur’s lemma.
The first term of the RHS of Equation (4.19) can be simplified as follows. We will begin by applying the
swap trick (Lemma 2.1) Tr[XY ] = Tr[FX⊗Y ] in the second line below. The swap trick is applied to register
CC ′, with the operators X and Y defined as indicated below.
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
σABT (Uk)
†
CV
†
CB˜→CB(Uk)C |0〉〈0|T︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
(Uk)
†
CVCB→CB˜(Uk)C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
U⊗2k
)
CC′ V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2k
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
=
1
|K|
∑
k
Tr
[(
U⊗2k
)†
CC′ (σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
U⊗2k
)
CC′ V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜FCC′
]
≤
∫
Tr
[(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ (σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V
†
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜FCC′
]
+ δ
=
∫
Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V †CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
+ δ. (4.21)
The inequality above follows the same way as in Equation 4.20. Let d = |C|. We calculate the integral above
using Lemma B.8, as follows.∫
U⊗2V †
CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
dU = 1CC′ ⊗R1B + FCC′ ⊗RFB , (4.22)
where we have set
R1B =
1
d(d2 − 1)
(
d3Γ †V ΓV − d1
)
=
1
(d2 − 1)
(
d2Γ †V ΓV − 1
)
RFB =
1
d(d2 − 1)
(
d21− d2Γ †V ΓV
)
=
d
(d2 − 1)
(
1− Γ †V ΓV
)
.
plugging (4.22) into (4.21) and using Lemma 2.1 again, we get∫
Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)U⊗2CC′V †CB˜→CBVC′B→C′B˜
(
U⊗2
)†
CC′ FCC′
]
= Tr
[
(σABT ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ′)
(
1CC′ ⊗R1B2→B˜2 + FCC′ ⊗RFB2→B˜2
)
FCC′
]
= Tr
[|%〉〈%|B (R1B + |A|RFB)]
= Tr
[
|%〉〈%|B
(
d(d− |A|)
d2 − 1
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
B
+
d|A| − 1
d2 − 1 1B
)]
. (4.23)
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Now recall that d = |A||T |. Using the fact that (a − 1)/(b − 1) ≤ a/b for b ≥ a, we can give a bound as
follows.
Tr
[
|%〉〈%|
(
d(d− |A|)
d2 − 1
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
+
d|A| − 1
d2 − 1 1
)]
=
d|A|(|T | − 1)
d2 − 1 〈%|
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
|%〉+ d|A| − 1
d2 − 1
≤ 〈%|
(
Γ †V ΓV
)
|%〉+ 1|T | . (4.24)
Putting everything together, we arrive at
1
|K|
∑
k
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖22 ≤
1
|T | + 3δ. (4.25)
By Markov’s inequality this implies
P
[∥∥(ΓV − Φk)|%〉∥∥22 > α( 1|T | + 3δ
)]
≤ 1
α
(4.26)
which is equivalent to
P
[∥∥(ΓV − Φk)|%〉∥∥2 > α1/2( 1|T | + 3δ
)1/2]
≤ 1
α
, (4.27)
where the probability is taken over the uniform distribution on D. Choosing α = (1/|T |+ 3δ)−1/3 this yields
P
[
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖2 >
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3]
≤
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
. (4.28)
Let S ⊂ D be such that |S|/|D| ≥ 1 − (1/|T | + 3δ)1/3 and ‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖2 ≤ (1/|T | + 3δ)1/3 for all
Uk ∈ S. Using the easy-to-verify inequality ‖|ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ|‖1 ≤ 2‖|ψ〉 − |φ〉‖2, given as Lemma B.2 in the
supplementary material, we can bound
1
|K|
∑
Uk∈D
∥∥∥Φk|%〉〈%| (Φk)† − ΓV |%〉〈%|Γ †V ∥∥∥
1
≤ 1|S|
∑
Uk∈S
∥∥∥Φk|%〉〈%| (Φk)† − ΓV |%〉〈%|Γ †V ∥∥∥
1
+ 2
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
≤ 2|S|
∑
Uk∈S
‖(ΓV − Φk)|%〉‖2 + 2|T |−1/3
≤ 4
(
1
|T | + 3δ
)1/3
. (4.29)
This completes the proof for pure states and isometric adversary channels. As noted above, the general case
follows. uunionsq
As an example, one may set |T | = 2s (i.e. s tag qubits) and take an approximate unitary 2-design of
accuracy 2−s. The resulting scheme would then be Ω(2−s/3)-GYZ-authenticating.
A straightforward corollary of the above result is that, in the case of unitary schemes, adding tags to
non-malleable schemes results in GYZ authentication. We leave open the question of whether this is the case
for general (not necessarily unitary) schemes.
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Corollary 4.11 Let (τ, E,D) be a 2−rn-non-malleable unitary QES with plaintext space A. Define a new
scheme (τ, E′, D′) with plaintext space A′ where A = TA′ and
E′(X) = E(X ⊗ |0〉〈0|T )
D′(Y ) = 〈0|TD(Y )|0〉T + Tr [(1T − |0〉〈0|T )D(Y )] |⊥〉〈⊥| .
Then there exists a constant r > 0 such that (τ, E′, D′) is 2−Ω(n)-GYZ-authenticating if |T | = 2Ω(n).
The proof is a direct application of Theorem 4.5 (approximate non-malleability is equivalent to approximate
2-design) and Theorem 4.9 (approximate 2-designs suffice for GYZ authentication.) We emphasize that, by
Remark 2.3, exponential accuracy requirements can be met with polynomial-size circuits.
DNS authentication from non-malleability. We end with a theorem concerning the case of general
(i.e., not necessarily unitary) schemes. We show that adding tags to a non-malleable scheme results in a
DNS-authenticating scheme. In this proof we will denote the output system of the decryption map by A to
emphasize that it is A enlarged by the reject symbol.
Theorem 4.12 Let r be a sufficiently large constant, and let (τ, E,D) be an 2−rn-NM QES with n qubit
plaintext space A, and choose an integer d dividing |A|. Then there exists a decomposition A = TA′ and a
state |ψ〉T such that |T | = d and the scheme (τ, E′, D′) defined by
Et(X) = E(X ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|T )
Dt(Y ) = 〈ψ|TD(Y )|ψ〉T + Tr [(1T − |ψ〉〈ψ|T )D(Y )] |⊥〉〈⊥| .
is (4/|T |) + 2−Ω(n)-DNS-authenticating.
Proof. We prove the statement for ε = 0 for simplicity, the general case follows easily by employing Theo-
rem 4.4 instead of Theorem 3.7.
By Theorem 3.7, for any attack map ΛCB→CB˜ , the effective map is equal to
Λ˜AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2〈DK(τC)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ (4.30)
for CP maps Λ′ and Λ′′ whose sum is TP. The effective map under the tagged scheme is therefore
Λ˜t
A′B→A′B˜ = 〈ψ|T Λ˜AB→AB˜((·)⊗ ψT )|ψ〉T
+ Tr
[
(1T − ψT )Λ˜AB→AB˜((·)⊗ ψT )
]|⊥〉〈⊥|
= (idA′)A′→A′ ⊗ Λ′B→B˜
+
(|C|2〈(〈ψ|TDK(τC)|ψ〉T )A′ ⊕ β|⊥〉〈⊥|〉− idA′)A→A′ ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜|C|2 − 1
with β = Tr [(1− ψ)TDK(τC)]. We would like to say that, unless the output is the reject symbol, the effective
map on A is the identity. We do not know, however, what DK(τC) looks like. Therefore we apply a standard
reasoning that if a quantity is small in expectation, then there exists at least one small instance. We calculate
the expectation of Tr〈ψ|TDK(τC)|ψ〉T when the decomposition A = TA′ is drawn at random according to
the Haar measure,∫
Tr〈ψ|U†ADK(τC)UA|ψ〉TdUA = Tr
[(∫
UA|ψ〉T ⊗ 1A′ψU†AdUA
)
DK(τC)
]
=
Tr1A
TrΠacc
TrΠaccDK(τC)
≤ 1/|T |. (4.31)
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Hence there exists at least one decomposition A = TA′ and a state |ψ〉T such that γˆ := Tr〈ψ|TDK(τC)|ψ〉T ≤
1/|T |. Define γ = max(γˆ, |C|−2). For the resulting primed scheme, let
Λrej :=
(1− γ)|C|2
|C|2 − 1 Λ
′′ and Λacc = Λ′ +
γ|C|2 − 1
|C|2 − 1 Λ
′′ .
We calculate the diamond norm difference between the real effective map an the ideal effective map,∥∥Λ˜t − id⊗ Λacc − 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥
≤ ∥∥id⊗ Λ′ + 1|C|2 − 1(|C|2〈(〈ψ|DK(τ)|ψ〉)〉− id)⊗ Λ′′ − id⊗ Λacc∥∥
+
∥∥〈|⊥〉〉〈⊥〉| ⊗ (1− γˆ)|C|2Λ′′/(|C|2 − 1)− 〈|⊥〉〈⊥|〉 ⊗ Λrej∥∥
≤ (1 + |C|−2)(|T |−1 + 2|C|−2)
= |T |−1(1 + (|A′||T |)−2)(1 + 2|A′|−2)
≤ 4|T |−1 (4.32)
as desired . uunionsq
5 Open problems
We close with a few natural open questions.
First, one might consider other formulations of quantum non-malleability. We believe that our definition
(i.e., NM) captures the correct class of schemes; given this, there may still be more natural formulation of
that class. For example, one may ask whether the definition must directly reference the attack map Λ (our
definition does do so, through the quantity p=(Λ, %).) Indeed, one may ask for a definition which refers only
to newly created correlations between the adversary and the decryption; of course, one must still capture
resistance to the attacks which led us to use p=(Λ, %) in our formulation. On the other hand, it may also
be appealing to give a formulation which intensifies the dependence on the attack map, to reflect the fact
that direct correlations between the adversary’s initial side information and the plaintext are completely
destroyed for p=(Λ, %) = 0.
Second, our characterization of non-malleable schemes (i.e., Theorem C.3) comes with an approximation
penalty in the converse direction. It would be interesting to see whether the dimension factors in the penalty
are necessary. A tightened entropic condition could simplify this task for one of the implications.
Finally, there are also open questions concerning the connection between quantum non-malleability and
authentication. For instance, one may ask whether adding “tags” (i.e., 0-qubits which are measured and
checked during decryption) to an arbitrary non-malleable scheme results in a GYZ-authenticating scheme.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Anne Broadbent, Alexander Mu¨ller-Hermes, Fre´de´ric Dupuis and Christo-
pher Broadbent2016n for helpful discussions. G.A. and C.M. acknowledge financial support from the Eu-
ropean Research Council (ERC Grant Agreement 337603), the Danish Council for Independent Research
(Sapere Aude) and VILLUM FONDEN via the QMATH Centre of Excellence (Grant 10059).
20
Bibliography
[1] Scott Aaronson and Daniel Gottesman. Improved simulation of stabilizer circuits. Physical Review A,
70(5):052328, 2004.
[2] Dorit Aharonov, Michael Ben-Or, and Elad Eban. Interactive proofs for quantum computations. In Inno-
vations in Computer Science - ICS 2010, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, January 5-7, 2010. Pro-
ceedings, pages 453–469, 2010. URL http://conference.itcs.tsinghua.edu.cn/ICS2010/content/
papers/35.html.
[3] Robert Alicki and Mark Fannes. Continuity of quantum conditional information. Journal of Physics A:
Mathematical and General, 37(5):L55, 2004.
[4] Andris Ambainis, Michele Mosca, Alain Tapp, and Ronald De Wolf. Private quantum channels. In focs,
pages 547–553, 2000.
[5] Andris Ambainis, Jan Bouda, and Andreas Winter. Nonmalleable encryption of quantum information.
Journal of Mathematical Physics, 50(4):042106, 2009.
[6] Koenraad MR Audenaert. A sharp continuity estimate for the von neumann entropy. Journal of Physics
A: Mathematical and Theoretical, 40(28):8127, 2007.
[7] Howard Barnum, Claude Cre´peau, Daniel Gottesman, Adam Smith, and Alain Tapp. Authentication
of quantum messages. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings. The 43rd Annual IEEE
Symposium on, pages 449–458. IEEE, 2002.
[8] Michael Ben-Or and Dominic Mayers. General security definition and composability for quantum and
classical protocols, september 2004. arXiv preprint quant-ph/0409062, 2004.
[9] Mario Berta, Matthias Christandl, and Renato Renner. The quantum reverse shannon theorem based
on one-shot information theory. Communications in Mathematical Physics, 306(3):579–615, 2011.
[10] Mario Berta, Fernando GSL Brandao, Christian Majenz, and Mark M Wilde. Deconstruction and
conditional erasure of quantum correlations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.06994, 2016.
[11] Fernando GSL Brandao, Aram W Harrow, and Micha l Horodecki. Local random quantum circuits are
approximate polynomial-designs. Communications in Mathematical Physics, 346(2):397–434, 2016.
[12] Anne Broadbent and Evelyn Wainewright. Efficient simulation for quantum message authentication. In
Information Theoretic Security: 9th International Conference, ICITS 2016, Tacoma, WA, USA, August
9-12, 2016, Revised Selected Papers 9, pages 72–91. Springer, 2016.
[13] Man-Duen Choi. Completely positive linear maps on complex matrices. Linear algebra and its applica-
tions, 10(3):285–290, 1975.
[14] Richard Cleve, Debbie Leung, Li Liu, and Chunhao Wang. Near-linear constructions of exact unitary
2-designs. Quantum Information and Computation, 16(9&10):0721–0756, 2016.
[15] Christoph Dankert, Richard Cleve, Joseph Emerson, and Etera Livine. Exact and approximate unitary
2-designs and their application to fidelity estimation. Physical Review A, 80(1):012304, 2009.
[16] Fre´de´ric Dupuis, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Louis Salvail. Secure two-party quantum evaluation of
unitaries against specious adversaries. In Annual Cryptology Conference, pages 685–706. Springer, 2010.
[17] Fre´de´ric Dupuis, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Louis Salvail. Actively secure two-party evaluation of any
quantum operation. In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2012, pages 794–811. Springer, 2012.
[18] Fre´de´ric Dupuis, Mario Berta, Ju¨rg Wullschleger, and Renato Renner. One-shot decoupling. Commu-
nications in Mathematical Physics, 328(1):251–284, 2014.
[19] Mark Fannes. A continuity property of the entropy density for spin lattice systems. Communications
in Mathematical Physics, 31(4):291–294, 1973.
[20] William Fulton and Joe Harris. Representation theory: a first course, volume 129. Springer, 1991.
[21] Sumegha Garg, Henry Yuen, and Mark Zhandry. New security notions and feasibility results for au-
thentication of quantum data. In Annual International Cryptology Conference, pages 342–371. Springer,
2017.
[22] Patrick Hayden, Debbie W Leung, and Dominic Mayers. The universal composable security of quantum
message authentication with key recyling. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.09434, 2016.
[23] Andrzej Jamio lkowski. Linear transformations which preserve trace and positive semidefiniteness of
operators. Reports on Mathematical Physics, 3(4):275–278, 1972.
[24] Akinori Kawachi, Christopher Portmann, and Keisuke Tanaka. Characterization of the relations be-
tween information-theoretic non-malleability, secrecy, and authenticity. In International Conference on
Information Theoretic Security, pages 6–24. Springer, 2011.
[25] Elliott H Lieb and Mary Beth Ruskai. A fundamental property of quantum-mechanical entropy. Physical
Review Letters, 30(10):434, 1973.
[26] Richard A Low. Pseudo-randomness and learning in quantum computation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1006.5227, 2010.
[27] Christian Majenz, Mario Berta, Fre´de´ric Dupuis, Renato Renner, and Matthias Christandl. Catalytic
decoupling of quantum information. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.00514, 2016.
[28] Ueli Maurer and Renato Renner. Abstract cryptography. In In Innovations in Computer Science.
Citeseer, 2011.
[29] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac L Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum information. Cambridge
university press, 2010.
[30] Mark S Pinsker. Information and information stability of random variables and processes. 1960.
[31] Christopher Portmann. Quantum authentication with key recycling. In Annual International Conference
on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 339–368. Springer, 2017.
[32] W Forrest Stinespring. Positive functions on c*-algebras. Proceedings of the American Mathematical
Society, 6(2):211–216, 1955.
[33] Dominique Unruh. Simulatable security for quantum protocols. arXiv preprint quant-ph/0409125, 2004.
[34] Reinhard F Werner and Alexander S Holevo. Counterexample to an additivity conjecture for output
purity of quantum channels. Journal of Mathematical Physics, 43(9):4353–4357, 2002.
[35] Mark M Wilde. Quantum information theory. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
A Some simple proofs
In this section, we give some simple proofs about our definition of information-theoretic secrecy for quantum
encryption. We also connect our notion of quantum non-malleability to classical non-malleability.
A.1 Secrecy
In the case of unitary schemes, information-theoretic quantum secrecy is equivalent to the unitary one-design
property.
Proposition A.1 A unitary QES (τK , E,D) is ITS if and only if D = {Uk}k∈K is a unitary 1-design, where
Ek(X) = UkXU
†
k .
Proof. Let D be a unitary 1-design. Then the scheme is ITSby Schur’s Lemma (See, e.g., [20]). Conversely,
let (τK , E,D) be ITS, i.e. T (1)D (%AB) = (EK)(%AB) = T (1)D (%A) ⊗ %B . Suppose that there exist %A, %′A such
that T (1)D (%A) 6= T (1)D (%′A). Then I(A : B)σ > 0 for σ = E( 12 (%A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B + %′A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B)), which is a
contradiction. This implies T
(1)
D (%A) = σ
0
A for all %A. But T
(1)
D (τA) = τA, i.e. σ
0
A = τA. The observation that
the positive semidefinite matrices span the whole matrix space finishes the proof. uunionsq
Next, we show that the two notions of perfect secrecy (ITS and IND) are equivalent. Using Pinsker’s
inequality (Lemma B.6) and the Alicki-Fannes inequality (Lemma B.5) one can also show that ε-ITS implies
(4
√
2ε)-IND, and that ε-IND implies (4h(ε) + 6ε log |A|)-ITS.
Proposition A.2 A QES (τK , E,D) is ITS if and only if it is IND.
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Proof. Let (τK , E,D) be ITS. Then there exists a σ
C
0 such that for all %AB (EK)KA→KC(%AB) = σ
0
C⊗%B . This
can be seen as follows: By definition every %AB is mapped to a product state. Suppose now EK(%A) 6= EK(%′A),
then I(C : B)σCB 6= 0 with σCB = EK( 12 (%A⊗|0〉〈0|B+%′A⊗|1〉〈1|B)), a contradiction. From this observation
the IND-property follows immediately.
Conversely, let (τK , E,D) be IND, that is in particular∥∥∥(EK)A→C(%(0)A − %(1)A )∥∥∥
1
= 0 (A.1)
for all %
(i)
A , i = 0, 1, i.e. (EK)A→C = σ
0
CTr(·) for some quantum state σ0C , as the set of quantum states spans
all of B(HC). Now the ITS-property follows immediately. uunionsq
Next, we revisit in detail the example that shows that, in the approximate setting, there exist unitary
schemes which can only be broken with access to side information. This is in contrast to the exact setting,
where side information is unhelpful.
Example A.3 Let D = {Uˆ (k)}k be an exact unitary 2-design on a Hilbert space HA of even dimension
|A| = d. Let VA be the unitary matrix with
Vj (d−j+1) = i · sign(d− 2j + 1)
for all j, and all other entries equal to zero. Set, for each k,
U (k) = Uˆ (k)V
(
Uˆ (k)
)T
.
Define a QES by Ek(X) = U
(k)X
(
U (k)
)†
and Dk = E
†
k.
It is easy to check that EK(XA) =
1
d−1 (dτA − XTA) is the Werner-Holevo channel [34]. For any two
quantum states %A, %
′
A,
‖EK(%A)− EK(%′A)‖1 =
1
d− 1
∥∥∥%′TA − %TA∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
d− 1 . (A.2)
On the other hand
‖EK − 〈τ〉‖ =
1
d− 1 ‖〈τ〉 − θ‖
≥ 1
d− 1 (‖θ‖ − ‖〈τ〉‖)
≥1. (A.3)
The last step follows because the transposition map, here denoted by θ, has diamond norm d3. By the
definition of the diamond norm there exists a state %AB such that
‖EK(%AB − τA ⊗ %B)‖1 = ‖(EK − 〈τA〉) (%AB)‖1 ≥ 1. (A.4)
In other words, we have exhibited a QES that is not ε-IND for any ε < 1/2, but adversaries without side
information achieve only negligible distinguishing advantage.
3 this is well known, the lower bound needed here can be obtained by applying the transposition to half of a maximally
entangled state
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A.2 Non-malleability
We begin by recalling the following definition of classical, information-theoretic non-malleability. To this end
we set down the notation in the classical case by giving a definition of a classical symmetric key encryption
scheme.
Definition A.4 Let X , C,K be finite alphabets (finite sets). An symmetric key encryption scheme (SKES)
(K,E,D) is a key random variable (RV) K on K together with a pair of stochastic maps E : X × K → C
and D : C × K → X ∪ {⊥} such that
E(·, k) ◦D(·, k) = idX 4, (A.5)
where idX denotes the identity function of X ( correctness). We write Ek = E(·, k) and analoguously Dk.
Definition A.5 (Classical non-malleability [24]) A classical SKES scheme (K,E,D) is non-malleable
if the following holds. For all RVs X on X independent of the key, and all RVs C˜ on C independent of the
key given X,C = E(X,K) such that P[C˜ = C] = 0,
I(X˜ : C˜|XC) = 0, (A.6)
where X˜ = D(C˜,K).
Next we show that, if a classical scheme satisfies our notion of information-theoretic quantum non-
malleability, then it is also classically non-malleable according to Definition A.5 above.
Proposition A.6 Let (τK , D,E) be a SKES embedded in to the quantum formalism in the standard way,
which satisfies NM. Then it is information theoretically non-malleable.
Proof. Let B be a trivial system and %AR be a maximally correlated classical state. Let furthermore B˜ ∼= CC ′,
and let ΛC→CB˜ be a classical map from C to C that makes a copy of both input and output to the B˜ register
and where Tr (|i〉〈i|C ⊗ 1B˜)ΛC→CB˜(|i〉〈i|C) = 0 for all standard basis vectors |i〉 (this is the condition
P[C = C˜] = 0). Then p=(Λ) = 0, and therefore according to the assumption
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) = 0, (A.7)
as B was trivial. Let X,C, C˜, X˜ be random variables corresponding to the systems A in the beginning, C
after encryption, C after the application of Λ and A after decryption, respectively. Then Equation (A.7)
reads
0 =I(XX˜ : CC˜)
=I(XX˜ : C) + I(XX˜ : C˜|C) (A.8)
=I(XX˜ : C) + I(X : C˜|C) + I(X˜ : C˜|CX), (A.9)
as the input state was maximally classically correlated. The fact that all (conditional) mutual information
terms above are non-negative finishes the proof. uunionsq
B Technical lemmas
In the following we prove some Lemmas in linear algebra and matrix analysis that we need in this article.
Lemma B.1 Let XA→B ∈ L(HA,HB) be a linear operator from A to B. Then
XA→B |φ+〉AA′ =
√
|B|
|A|X
T
B′→A′ |φ+〉BB′ . (B.1)
4 This again is a slight abuse of notation, more correctly the composition of encryption and decryption yields the
canonical injection of X into X ∪ {⊥}.
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Proof.
XA→B |φ+〉AA′ = 1√|A|
|A|−1∑
i=0
|B|−1∑
j=0
Xji|j〉B ⊗ |i〉A′
=
1√|A|
|A|−1∑
i=0
|B|−1∑
j=0
XTij |j〉B ⊗ |i〉A′
=
√
|B|
|A|X
T
B′→A′ |φ+〉BB′ . (B.2)
uunionsq
Lemma B.2 Let |ψ〉, |φ〉 ∈ H be two vectors. Then
‖|ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ|‖1 ≤ 2‖|ψ〉 − |φ〉‖2. (B.3)
Proof. The trace norm distance of two pure states is given by [29]
‖|ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ|‖1 = 2
√
1− | 〈φ | ψ〉 |2. (B.4)
We bound
‖|ψ〉〈ψ| − |φ〉〈φ|‖1 =2
√
1− | 〈φ | ψ〉 |2
=2
√
(1− | 〈φ | ψ〉 |)(1 + | 〈φ | ψ〉 |)
≤2
√
2(1− | 〈φ | ψ〉 |)
≤2
√
2(1− Re(〈φ | ψ〉))
=2‖|ψ〉 − |φ〉‖2 (B.5)
uunionsq
Lemma B.3 Let Λ
(i)
A→B, i = 0, 1 be CPTP maps such that
‖ηΛ(0) − ηΛ(1)‖1 ≤ ε.
Then the two maps are also close in diamond norm,∥∥∥Λ(0)A→B − Λ(1)A→B∥∥∥ ≤ |A|ε.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is a simple application of the Hlder inequality. Let |ψ〉AA′ =
√|A|ψ1/2A′ VA′ |φ+〉AA′
be an arbitrary pure state with VA′ a unitary. Then we have∥∥∥(Λ(0)A→B − Λ(1)A→B)(|ψ〉〈ψ|)∥∥∥
1
=|A|
∥∥∥ψ1/2A′ VA′(ηΛ(0) − ηΛ(1))V †A′ψ1/2A′ ∥∥∥
1
≤|A|
∥∥∥ψ1/2A′ ∥∥∥2∞ ‖VA′‖2∞ ‖ηΛ(0) − ηΛ(1)‖1 ≤ |A|ε. (B.6)
uunionsq
The next group of lemmas is concerned with entropic quantities.
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Lemma B.4 Let Λ
(i)
A→A′ be CPTP maps and Λ
(i)
B→B′ , i = 1, ..., k CP maps for i = 1, ..., k such that∑
i Λ
(i)
B→B′ is trace preserving. Let Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′ = Λ
(i)
A→A′ ⊗ Λ(i)B→B′ and define the CPTP maps
ΛAB→A′B′C =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|C and
Λ′B→B′C =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
B→B′ ⊗ |i〉〈i|C . (B.7)
Then
I(A′ : B′)Λ(%) ≤ I(A : B)% +H(C|A)Λ′(%) ≤ I(A : B)% +H(C)Λ(%) (B.8)
for any quantum state %AB.
Proof. Let %AB be a quantum state and define the following quantum states,
σA′B′CC′ =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
AB→A′B′(%AB)⊗ |i〉〈i|C ⊗ |i〉〈i|C′ and
σ′AB′CC′ =
k∑
i=1
Λ
(i)
B→B′(%AB)⊗ |i〉〈i|C ⊗ |i〉〈i|C′ , (B.9)
i.e. σ and σ′ are Λ and Λ′ applied to % with an extra copy of C. We bound
I(A′ : B′)σ ≤I(A′C : B′C ′)σ
≤I(AC : B′C ′)σ′
=I(A : B′C ′)σ′ + I(C : B′C ′|A)σ′
=I(A : B′C ′)σ′ +H(C|A)σ′
≤I(A : B)% +H(C|A)σ′
≤I(A : B)% +H(C)σ′ . (B.10)
The first and second inequality are due to the data processing inequality of the quantum mutual information.
The first equality is the chain rule for the quantum mutual information. The second equation is the fact
that the mutual information of two copies of a classical system cannot be increased by adding systems on
one side, relative to any conditioning system, and is equal to its entropy. The third inequality is due to the
data processing inequality for the quantum mutual information again and the last inequality is the fact that
conditioning can only decrease entropy. Using the definition of σ and σ′ this implies the claim. uunionsq
Lemma B.5 (Fannes-Audenaert inequality, Alicki-Fannes inequality, [19, 6, 3, 35]) Fck LaTeX!
Let %ABC and %
′
ABC be tripartite quantum states such that
‖%ABC − %′ABC‖1 ≤ ε. (B.11)
Then the following continuity bounds hold for entropic quantities:
|H(A)% −H(A)%′ | ≤ε
2
log (|A| − 1) + h
(ε
2
)
≤ ε log (|A|) + h(ε)
|H(A|B)% −H(A|B)%′ | ≤4ε log (|A|) + 2h(ε)
|I(A : B)% − I(A : B)%′ | ≤5ε log (min(|A|, |B|)) + 3h(ε)
|I(A : B|C)% − I(A : B|C)%′ | ≤8ε log (min(|A|, |B|)) + 4h(ε). (B.12)
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Lemma B.6 (Pinskers inequality, [30]) For quantum states %AB and σAB,
D(%A||σA) ≥1
2
‖%A − σA‖21
I(A : B)% ≥1
2
‖%AB − %A ⊗ %B‖21. (B.13)
The next two lemmas concern the theory of unitary designs, and representation theory, respectively.
Lemma B.7 Let dimH = d, and let D ⊂ U(H) be a finite set.
– If D is a δ-approximate channel twirl, then it is also a d · δ-approximate U -U twirl design.
– If D is a δ-approximate U -U twirl design, then it is also a d · δ-approximate channel twirl design.
Proof. Let D be a channel twirl design and %AA′B be a quantum state with A
′ ∼= A and B arbitrary. Let
furthermore
σAA′B = (1− %A′)1/2%−1/2A′ %AA′B%−1/2A′ (1− %A′)1/2.
Then
ηAA′BC =
1
d
(%AA′B ⊗ |0〉〈0|C + σAA′B ⊗ |1〉〈1|C)
is positive semidefinite, has trace 1 and ηA′ = τA′ , i.e. it is the CJ-state of a quantum channel ΛA→ABC . By
assumption we have that ∥∥T chD (Λ)− T chHaar(Λ)∥∥ ≤ δ.
This implies in particular that the CJ states of the two channels have trace norm distance at most δ, i.e.
δ ≥ ∥∥T D(η)− T Haar(η)∥∥1
=
1
d
(∥∥T D(%)− T Haar(%)∥∥1 + ∥∥T D(σ)− T Haar(σ)∥∥1)
≥1
d
∥∥T D(%)− T Haar(%)∥∥1 . (B.14)
As % was chosen arbitrarily this implies ∥∥T D − T Haar∥∥ ≤ d · δ. (B.15)
uunionsq
Conversely, let D be a U -U -twirl design, and let ΛA→A be a CPTP map and |ψ〉AA′ ∈ HA ⊗ HA′ be
an arbitrary state vector with HA′ ∼= HA. For calculating the diamond norm, we can choose |ψ〉AA′ =√
dψA′ |φ+〉AA′ . We bound ∥∥[(T chD − T chHaar) (Λ)]A→A (|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′)∥∥1
=d
∥∥∥[(T chD − T chHaar) (Λ)]A→A (ψ 12A′ |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ψ 12A′)∥∥∥1
=d
∥∥∥ψ 12A′ [(T D − T Haar) (ηΛ)AA′]ψ 12A′∥∥∥
1
≤d‖ψA′‖∞
∥∥(T D − T Haar) (ηΛ)AA′∥∥1
≤d · δ.
Here we used the mirror lemma in the second equality, the Hlder inequality twice in the first inequality, and
the fact that ‖%‖∞ ≤ 1 for any quantum state %, and the assumption, in the last inequality.
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Lemma B.8 Let MA2B be a matrix on H⊗2A ⊗HB. Then we have the following formula for integration with
respect to the Haar measure: ∫
U⊗2A MA2B(U
⊗2
A )
†dU = 1A2 ⊗R1B + FA ⊗RFB , (B.16)
with
R1B =
1
d(d2 − 1) (dTrA2M − TrA2FM) ,
RFB =
1
d(d2 − 1) (dTrA2FM − TrA2M) . (B.17)
Proof. By Schur’s lemma, ∫
U⊗2A MA2B(U
⊗2
A )
†dU = Π∧ ⊗R∧ +Π∨ ⊗R∨ (B.18)
for some matrices R
∧
and R
∨
, where Π∧ is the projector onto the antisymmetric subspace and Π∨ the
projector onto the symmetric subspace. As Π∧ = (1−F )/2 and Π∨ = (1+F )/2, this implies the correctness
of Equation (B.16). The formulas (B.17) follow by applying TrA and TrA(F (·)) to both sides of Equation
(B.16) and solving the resulting system of 2 equations for R1B and R
F
B . uunionsq
The final lemma characterizes CPTP maps that are invertible on their image such that the inverse is
CPTP as well.
Lemma B.9 Let (τK , E,D) be a QES. Then the encryption maps have the structure
(Ek)A→C = (Vk)ACˆ→C
(
(·)⊗ σ(k)
Cˆ
)
(Vk)
†
ACˆ→C , (B.19)
and the decryption maps hence must have the form
(Dk)C→A = TrCˆ
[
Πsuppσk (Vk)
†
ACˆ→C (·) (Vk)ACˆ→C
]
+
(
Dˆk
)
ACˆ→A
[
(1Cˆ −Πsuppσk) (Vk)†ACˆ→C (·) (Vk)ACˆ→C (1Cˆ −Πsuppσk)
]
(B.20)
for some quantum states σ
(k)
Cˆ
, isometries (Vk)C→ACˆ , and some CPTP map Dˆk.
Proof. Let |φ〉AA′ be some bipartite pure state. By the correctness of the scheme and the data processing
inequality of the mutual information (see Lemma B.4), we have that
2H(A′)φ =2H(A′)Ek(φ) ≥ I(A′ : C)Ek(φ)
≥I(A′ : A)Dk(Ek(φ)) = 2H(A′)Ek(φ) = 2H(A′)φ, (B.21)
i.e. 2H(A′)φ = I(A′ : C)ψ. The first inequality is an easy-to-check elementary fact. It is easy to see that this
only holds if the purification of ψA′ = φA′ lies entirely in C, i.e. there exists an isometry U
(k)
C→ACˆ such that
U
(k)
C→ACˆEk(φ)
(
U
(k)
C→ACˆ
)†
= φAA′ ⊗ σ(k). (B.22)
note that by the linearity of Ek and U
(k), σ(k) cannot depend on φ. As the state φ was arbitrary, this implies
that
Ek =
(
U
(k)
C→ACˆ
)† (
(·)⊗ σ(k)
)
U
(k)
C→ACˆ , (B.23)
i.e. Ek has the claimed form with Vk =
(
U (k)
)†
. The form of the decryption map then follows immediately
by correctness. uunionsq
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C Proof of characterization theorem
This section is dedicated to proving the characterization theorem for non-malleable quantum encryption
schemes, i.e., Theorem 4.4. We begin with two preparatory lemmas.
Lemma C.1 For any QES (τ, E,D) the map E := |K|−1∑kDk ⊗ ETk satisfies
E (|φ+〉〈φ+|CC′(XC ⊗ idC′)) = |A||C| |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′(E†K(X)⊗ idA′)
Proof. Using Lemma B.9 we derive an expression for ETk ,
Tr
[
ETk (Y )X
]
=Tr
[
E†k(Y )X
]
=Tr [YCEk(XA)]
=Tr
[
YCVk(XA ⊗ σ(k)Cˆ )V
†
k
]
=Tr
[
TrCˆ
(
σ
(k)
Cˆ
V †k Y Vk
)
X
]
=Tr
[
TrCˆ
(
σ
(k)
Cˆ
V Tk Y V k
)
X
]
. (C.1)
Here we use the definition of the adjoint in the second equality and the cyclicity of the trace in the third
equality. Hence
ETk = TrCˆ
(
σ
(k)
Cˆ
V Tk (·)V k
)
(C.2)
Define Πk = Πsuppσ(k) to be the projector onto the support of σk. In the following we omit the subscripts
of CP maps and isometries to save space. We start with one summand in the sum defining E and omit the
second summand from the expression for Dk in Equation B.20
TrCˆCˆ′
[
(Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ(k)Cˆ′
] [
V †k ⊗ V Tk
]
φ+CC′XC
[
Vk ⊗ V k
]
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C| TrCˆCˆ′
[
(Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ(k)Cˆ′
] [
φ+AA′ ⊗ φ+CˆCˆ′
]
V †kXCVk
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C| TrCˆCˆ′φ
+
AA′ ⊗ φ+CˆCˆ′V
†
kXCVkσ
(k)
Cˆ
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C| φ
+
AA′〈φ+|CˆCˆ′V †kXCVkσ(k)Cˆ |φ
+〉CˆCˆ′
=
|A|
|C|φ
+
AA′TrCˆV
†
kXCVkσ
(k)
Cˆ
=
|A|
|C|φ
+
AA′ (Ek)
†
C→A (XC). (C.3)
Here we have used Lemma B.1 for the first and the second equality, and in the fourth equality is due to the
elementary fact that
〈φ+|CˆCˆ′YCˆ |φ+〉CˆCˆ′ =
1
|Cˆ|TrY. (C.4)
Finally we have used the complex conjugate of Equation C.2 in the last equation. Now we look at the same
expression but only taking the second summand from Equation B.20 into account.{
Dˆk ⊗ TrCˆ′
}[
(1−Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ(k)Cˆ′
] [
V †k ⊗ V Tk
]
φ+CC′XC
[
Vk ⊗ V k
]
=
|A||Cˆ|
|C|
(
Dˆk
)
ACˆ→A
⊗ TrCˆ′ (1−Πk)Cˆ ⊗ σ(k)Cˆ′ φ
+
AA′ ⊗ φ+CˆCˆ′V
†
kXCVk
=0 (C.5)
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where the steps are the same as above and in the last equality we used that (1−Πk)Cˆ σCˆ = 0. Adding
Equations (C.3) and (C.5), summing over k and normalizing finishes the proof.
Lemma C.2 Suppose (τK , E,D) satisfies Definition 4.2 for trivial B. Then E := |K|−1
∑
kDk⊗ETk satisfies∥∥∥∥∥E(X)− |A||C|
[
〈φ+|X|φ+〉|φ+〉〈φ+|+ Tr (Π−X) 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)A ⊗ τA′ − φ+AA′)
]∥∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
(
2
√
|A||C|+ 1
)
. (C.6)
Proof. It follows directly from the fact that (τK , E,D) is a QES together with Lemma B.1 that
E(φ+CC′) =
|A|
|C|φ
+
AA′ . (C.7)
Let Λ
(i)
C→CB˜1 , i = 0, 1 be two attack maps such that ηΛ(i) |φ
+〉 = 0 for i = 0, 1 and define
ΛC→CB˜1B˜2 =
1
2
∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜2 ⊗ Λ(i).
The the ε-NM property implies
I(AA′ : B˜1B˜2)ηΛ˜ ≤ ε,
and therefore, using Pinsker’s inequality, Lemma B.6,∥∥∥∥∥12 ∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜ ⊗ (ηΛ˜(i))CC′B˜1
− 1
4
∑
i=0,1
|i〉〈i|B˜ ⊗ (ηΛ˜(i))B˜1
⊗
∑
i=0,1
(ηΛ˜(i))CC′
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
2ε. (C.8)
Observe that
ηΛ˜ =
1
|K|
∑
k
Dk ◦ Λ ◦ Ek(φ+AA′)
=
|C|
|A|
1
|K|
∑
k
(
Dk ⊗ ETk
) ◦ Λ(φ+CC′)
=
|C|
|A| E ◦ Λ(φ
+
CC′). (C.9)
Setting (ηΛ(0))CC′B˜1 = τ
−
CC′ ⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 , we get
ηΛ˜(0) =
|C|
|A| E(τ
−)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1
=
|C|
|A|
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2E(τCC′)− E(φ+CC′))⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1
=
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 . (C.10)
and therefore∥∥∥∥∥ 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ (ηΛ(1))B˜1 − |C||A| E ((ηΛ(1))CC′B˜1)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε (C.11)
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for all Λ(1). For any state %CC′B˜1 with %CC′B˜ |φ+〉CC′ = 0, we define the state
%′
CC′B˜1B˜2
=
1
C
(|0〉〈0|B˜2 ⊗ %CC′B˜1 + |1〉〈1|B˜2 ⊗ [((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)φ+ ((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)]⊗ %B˜2) .
Here, V is a unitary such that Tr(1C − %C)V TC = 0. It is easy to see that such a unitary always exists, the
existence is equivalent to the fact that any |C|-tuple of real numbers is the ordered list of side lengths of a
polygon in the complex plain. Note that %′
CC′B˜1B˜2
|φ+〉CC′ = 0, and %′C′ = τC′ . Together with the triangle
inequality, equation (C.11) implies therefore that
1
|C|
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E(%)− 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ %B˜1
∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E [((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)φ+ ((1C − %C)⊗ VC′)]
−|C| − 1|C|
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′) ∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε,
i.e. in particular
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E(%)− 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)⊗ %B˜1
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|C|.
As % was arbitrary we have proven that
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| E −
〈
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)〉∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|C|. (C.12)
The only fact that is left to show is, that ‖E(|φ+〉〈v|)‖1 is small for all normalized |v〉 such that 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0.
To this end, observe that TrA ◦ E(σC ⊗ (·)C′) = ETK for all quantum states σC . Let %C be any quantum state
that does not have full rank, note that such states span all of B(HC), and for hermitian operators there
exists a decomposition into such operators that saturates the triangle inequality. Taking a quantum state
σC such that 〈φ+|%⊗ σ|φ+〉 = 1|C|Tr%CσTC = 0 (the first equality is the mirror lemma B.1), we have
∥∥∥∥E(%⊗ σ)− |A||C| 1|C|2 − 1 (|C|2DK(τC)⊗ τA − φ+AA′)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
according to what we have already proven. Using inequality (C.12) we arrive at
∥∥∥∥E†K(X)− |A||C|τATr(X)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
2ε|A|‖X‖1 (C.13)
For Hermitian matrices X and therefore∥∥∥∥E†K(X)− |A||C|τATr(X)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 4
√
2ε|A|‖X‖1 (C.14)
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For arbitrary X. We can write |v〉CC′ = XC |φ+〉CC′ for some traceless matrix XC . Now we calculate∥∥E(∣∣φ+〉〈v|CC′)∥∥1 =∥∥∥∥ |A||C| |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ (E†K(X†))A
∥∥∥∥
1
=
|A|
|C|
∥∥∥(E†K(X))
A
|φ+〉AA′
∥∥∥
2
=
√|A|
|C|
∥∥∥E†K(X)∥∥∥
2
≤
√|A|
|C|
∥∥∥E†K(X)∥∥∥
1
≤|A|
3/2
|C| 4
√
2ε‖X‖1
≤4
√
2ε|A|3/2. (C.15)
The first equation is Lemma C.1, the sencond and third equations are easily verified, the first inequality is a
standard norm inequality, the second inequality is Equation (C.14), and the last inequality follows from the
normalization of |v〉. By the Schmidt decomposition, we get a stabilized version of this inequality,∥∥E(|φ+〉CC′ |α〉B˜1〈v|CC′B˜1)∥∥1 ≤2√2ε|A|3/2, (C.16)
for all |α〉B˜1 and all |v〉CC′B˜ such that 〈φ+ | v〉 = 0 Combining everything we arrive at∥∥∥∥∥E(X)− |A||C|
[
〈φ+|X|φ+〉|φ+〉〈φ+|
+ Tr
(
Π−X
) 1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τC)A ⊗ τA′ − φ+AA′) ]
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ 2
√
2ε|A|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (C.17)
uunionsq
We are now ready to prove the characterization theorem (i.e., Theorem 4.4) in the ε-approximate setting.
We remark that the exact setting (stated and sketched as Theorem 3.7 in the main text) is simply the case
where ε = 0.
Theorem C.3 (Precise version of Theorem 4.4) Let Π = (τ, E,D) be a QES.
1. If Π is ε-NM, then any attack map ΛCB→CB˜ results in an effective map Λ˜AB→AB˜ fulfilling∥∥∥Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜∥∥∥ ≤ 2√2ε|A|4|C|(4√|A|+ 1) , (C.18)
where
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ = idA ⊗ Λ′B→B˜ +
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2 〈DK(τ)〉 − id)A ⊗ Λ′′B→B˜ ,
with Λ′ = TrCC′ [φ+CC′Λ(φ
+
CC′ ⊗ (·))] and Λ′′ = TrCC′ [Π−CC′Λ(φ+CC′ ⊗ (·))].
2. Conversely, if for a scheme all effective maps fulfil Equation (C.18) with the right hand side replaced
by ε, then it is 5ε(log(|A|) + r) + 3h(ε)-NM, where r is a bound on the size of the honest user’s side
information.
Proof. We start with 1. We want to bound the diamond norm distance between the effective map Λ˜ resulting
from an attack Λ and the idealized effective map Λ˜exact. Let
|ψ〉AA′BB′ =
|A|2−1∑
i=0
√
pi|αi〉AA′ ⊗ |βi〉BB′
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be an arbitrary pure state given in its Schmidt decomposition across the bipartition AA′ vs. BB′. We can
Write |αi〉AA′ = X(i)A′ |φ+〉 for some matrices X(i) satisfying ‖X(i)‖∞ ≤ |A|. We calculate the action of Λ˜ on
|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′ ,
Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜(|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′) = X
(i)
A′
(
|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ Λ′B→B˜(|βi〉〈βj |BB′)
+
1
|C|2 − 1
(|C|2DK(τ)A ⊗ τA′ − |φ+〉〈φ+|AA′)⊗ Λ′′B→B˜(|βi〉〈βj |BB′))X(j)A′ . (C.19)
In a similar way we get
Λ˜AB→AB˜(|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′) = X(i)A′ Λ˜AB→AB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X(i)A′
=
|C|
|A|X
(i)
A′ ECC′→AA′ ◦ ΛCB→CB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|CC′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X(i)A′ .
(C.20)
Using Lemma C.2 we bound∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|αi〉〈αj |AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)∥∥∥1
=
∥∥∥X(i)A′ (Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)X(j)∥∥∥1
≤
∥∥∥X(i)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥X(j)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)∥∥∥1
=
∥∥∥X(i)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥X(j)∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥∥ |C||A| ECC′→AA′ ◦ ΛCB→CB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|CC′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)
− Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜(|φ+〉〈φ+|AA′ ⊗ |βi〉〈βj |BB′)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤2
√
2ε|A|2|C|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (C.21)
The inequalities result from applying Ho¨lder’s inequality twice, and Lemma C.2, respectively. Using the
triangle inequality we get
∥∥∥(Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜) (|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′)∥∥∥1 ≤2√2ε|A|2|C|(4√|A|+ 1)
|A|2−1∑
i,j=0
√
pipj
≤2
√
2ε|A|4|C|
(
4
√
|A|+ 1
)
. (C.22)
As |ψ〉 was arbitrary, we have proven∥∥∥Λ˜AB→AB˜ − Λ˜exactAB→AB˜∥∥∥ ≤2√2ε|A|4|C|(4√|A|+ 1) . (C.23)
Now let us prove 2. Let ΛCB→CB˜ again be an arbitrary attack map, and assume that the resulting
effective map is ε-close to Λ˜exact
AB→AB˜ . Observe that p
=(Λ, %) = TrΛ′(%B).
By Lemma B.5 and Lemma B.4, this implies
I(AR : B˜)Λ˜(%) ≤ I(AR : B)% + h(p=(Λ, %)) + 5ε log(|A||R|) + 3h(ε) (C.24)
with the help of Lemma B.4 (given in the appendix of the main article). uunionsq
33
